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God In The Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine
Matthew Sag*
Introduction
Yes, yes, our program just insinuated that George Pataki had a big, gay 
experience on the Staten Island Ferry. This is the beauty of fair use.1
Fair use plays a vital but misunderstood role in copyright law. The central 
dilemma for fair use jurisprudence is that without the flexibility of fair use , copyright 
would become unwieldy and oppressive; but if fair use allows too much freedom from 
copyright, it risks undermining the incentives that the creators of copyrighted works rely 
on. Typically, scholars express concern about one or the other half of this problem as 
determined by their policy preferences. This article puts aside outcome driven analysis 
and examines the larger role fair use serves within copyright law. It identifies two 
structural purposes embodied by fair use, one determining the shifting balance of 
copyright law, the other determining policy making authority over copyright law. First, 
fair use bounds copyright rights, and in doing so it enables expansive definition of those 
rights within those bounds. Second, fair use has allowed Congress to delegate to the 
courts the difficult policy decisions as to the details of copyright owners’ rights. 
*
 Matthew Sag is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Northwestern University School of Law. Thanks to
David Dana, Shari Diamond, Tonja Jacobi and the participants at the Northwestern University School of 
Law’s Zodiac forum for their many helpful comments. Thanks also to Oren Bracha, Marc Gergan, Tony 
Reece and Larry Sager for their comments on a much earlier draft. 
1 The Daily Show with John Stuart (Comedy Central television broadcast, Aug. 3, 2004).
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Many scholars have warned, with increasing urgency, that we are approaching the 
“tyranny of copyright.”2 This dark vision of a “permission culture” argues that our 
“creative ecosystem” is under threat because of certain legal and technological changes 
that have increased the rights of copyright owners.3 The potential tyranny of copyright 
stems from the combination of (1) our reliance on access to and use of existing works and 
(2) the increasingly pervasive “ownership” claimed with respect to those works.
Consumers and creators rely on access to existing works, not just in artistic fields but in 
countless areas of social, political, cultural and economic activity. Most of the fabric of 
our cultural and intellectual lives is owned in some fashion by someone else.4
These concerns are not without foundation, but they are overstated because one 
person’s claim of ownership with respect to a work says very little about what others can 
in fact do with that work, significantly, copyright ownership claims are contingent upon 
the application of fair use. Reliance on owned works does not necessarily preordain a life 
of intellectual servitude. The alleged tyranny of copyright is mitigated in part because 
copyright claims are limited by fair use. In the landmark Sony decision, the Supreme 
2 Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y Times, January 25, 2004. See also, LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND 
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: 
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
3 Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 130. 
4
 Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2003, at A16. (“The copyright system, though 
constitutional, is broken. It effectively and perpetually protects nearly all material that anyone would want 
to cite or use. That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public interest.”) 
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Court held that home video taping of broadcast television programs was not an 
infringement of copyright.5 Ownership of the copyright in the subject broadcasts was 
undisputed; what was disputed were the implications of that ownership. By a five to four 
majority the Court held that time-shifting by consumers was fair use and thus not 
copyright infringement.6 The majority reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that 
consumers were copying entire programs without the permission of the copyright owners. 
The majority also held that Sony, the maker of the VCR, was not liable for contributory 
infringement because time-shifting constituted a substantial noninfringing use for the 
product.7 Copyright ownership did not make copying by end users unlawful, and it did 
not make the VCR an unlawful device. 
Sony has become the poster-child decision for both consumers who believe they 
have a right to copy and for businesses that provide tools or services related to consumer 
copying. However, recent attempts by internet music pioneers Napster and MP3.com to 
extend Sony into the internet age both failed.8 These cases, and many others, highlight the 
uncertainty of fair use, especially in the context of new technology. Under the current 
state of the law, consumers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and copyright owners
often cannot know with certainty what will, and what will not, be deemed fair use 
without all the joy and expense of federal litigation. 
5 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir, 2001); UMG Recordings v. MP3.Com Inc., 
92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (2000).
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The uncertain scope of fair use undermines its ability to effectively guard the 
public interest in legitimate access to, and use of, copyrighted works. For example, 
without fair use, some documentaries would never be produced.9 Even with the fair use 
doctrine, the chilling effect of potential litigation may discourage many who could 
otherwise rely on the doctrine.
Recognition of the structural role of fair use has the potential to mitigate some of 
the uncertainty of current fair use jurisprudence. The statutory framework for fair use 
both mitigates and causes uncertainty. It mitigates uncertainty by providing a consistent 
framework of analysis – the four statutory factors. However, when judges apply the 
statutory factors without articulating or justifying their own assumptions, they increase 
uncertainty. The statutory factors mean nothing without certain a priori assumptions as to 
the scope of the copyright owner’s rights; a more stable and predictable fair use 
jurisprudence would begin to emerge if those assumptions were made more transparently 
and coherently. This is the focus of Part I. 
Part II describes the changes in copyright law brought about by the Copyright Act 
of 1976. Copyright skeptics regard the 1976 Act as an unwarranted expansion of 
copyright rights, constituting a triumph of special interest politics over the public good 
and common sense. Part II argues that, whatever the politics might have been, the shift to 
a dynamic system of copyright rights was a justified response to the combined problems 
of legislative gridlock and the expectation of continued technological and social change. 
9 Robert Greenwald’s Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War (2004), and Outfoxed: Rupert 
Murdoch's War on Journalism (2004) both rely on fair use. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting The 
President, Wired, 12.08, August 2004, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5.
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Part III, the heart of this article, examines the structural role of fair use in the 
context of an evolving copyright system. Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of 
expansive copyright rights are bound to be disappointed. Rather, fair use is a structural 
tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances. This article establishes this 
argument in two stages. First, recognition that the structural role of fair use is to enable 
broader more flexible rights to be vested in the copyright owner. Second, it shows that in 
order to preserve copyright’s ability to adapt to new technology, fair use must remain a 
somewhat open-ended standard developed by the judiciary through the imperfect process 
of common law adjudication.
Ultimately, the assumptions as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s rights 
can only be developed by deriving fundamental principles from copyright law itself. 
Exactly what those fundamental principles might be is obviously a matter of debate; but it 
is much narrower debate than that which is required by reference to normative 
conceptions of the good in general; and it is much more likely to result in stability and 
predictability in fair use jurisprudence than any of the cost- benefit approaches advocated 
in the literature. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on transformativeness in its most recent 
fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff Rose,10 is an important step toward a more coherent 
fair use doctrine; however, there are additional steps to be taken and other fundamental 
principles within copyright law beyond its preference for transformative uses. This 
recommendation is the subject of Part IV. 
There are three principles of copyright law beyond transformativeness that judges 
can use apply to give substance to the structural role of fair use. The first is the well 
10 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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established principle of the idea expression distinction. Recent case law suggests two 
other principles are emerging, but have yet to be articulated. These are the principles of 
consumer autonomy and medium neutrality. This article identifies these trends and their 
potential to provide a more principled and consistent basis for fair use analysis. 
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Part I – The Limits of Statutory Guidance on Fair Use
The difficulty of adjudicating fair use cases is well established. Almost every 
comment on the subject notes that fair use is “one of the most troublesome [doctrines] in 
the whole law of copyright.”11 One of the central difficulties of fair use jurisprudence is 
the indeterminacy of the statutory factors. The statutory codification of the fair use 
doctrine requires courts to consider four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) 
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.12
The statutory factors provide a useful framework for analysis, but their limitations 
must be explicitly recognized. The core limitation of the factors is that in order to 
determine their application one must make an a priori assumption as to the scope of the 
rights of the copyright owner. The challenge for fair use jurisprudence is to find a rational 
and consistent basis for those assumptions – the first step in that process is to admit that 
assumptions are being made. The current practice of most courts, treating the factors as 
outcome-determinative, as opposed to question-framing, masks a priori  assumptions and 
distorts judicial reasoning. 
Some commentators question whether the factors are relevant at all. David 
Nimmer’s study of the relevance of the four factors concludes that they are not outcome-
determinative, either individually or collectively.13 Nimmer surveyed the application of 
11 Dellar v Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
12
 17 U.S.C. 107.
13
 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” And Other Fairytales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
263, 280 (2003).
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each of the four factors in 60 fair use cases decided between 1994 and 2003.14 According 
to Nimmer’s (admittedly subjective) assessment, the factors corresponded with the 
ultimate finding only 55% , 42%, 57% and 50% of cases respectively.15 Even in the few 
cases in which all four factors appeared to line up in the same direction, either fair or 
unfair, they still had no predictive value.16 From Nimmer’s perspective, the four factors 
uniformly pointed to one conclusion in eleven of the sixty cases, however, that clean 
sweep only corresponded with the actual result in six of those cases; i.e. in 54% of cases. 
Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair 
use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the 
same.17
Nimmer’s findings must be treated with some caution because litigated cases may 
not tell us anything about the broader universe of fair use disputes.18 Nonetheless, 
Nimmer’s findings provide rudimentary support for this article’s contention that the four 
statutory factors are largely incapable of determining the outcome of fair use cases in any 
objective sense. The next four subsections briefly review the statutory factors to 
demonstrate that they are not outcome-determinative and that significant assumptions 
must be made before the factors can be applied.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor as to whether a use a work is a fair use is “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
14 Id. at 268.
15 Id. at 280.
16 Id. 282 – 284.
17 Id. at 280.
18 See Priest & Klein, The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984).
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nonprofit educational purposes.”19 The law in with respect to this factor has weaved a 
curious path. Commercial uses have been held fair,20 educational uses have not.21 The 
Supreme Court’s comment that there are no bright line rules for applying the fair use 
doctrine,22 appears, if anything, to be an understatement. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court majority Sony declared that “every commercial use of 
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation”23 In 1994, the Court was 
asked to adjudicate the fairness of 2 Live Crew’s indisputably commercial parody of an 
old Roy Orbison song in Campbell. In that case, the Court held that there was no 
presumption that commercial use was unfair. As the Court observed, 
[any such presumption] would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in 
the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, 
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities … which are generally 
conducted for profit.24
The Campbell decision also marked another more subtle departure from Sony
concerning the purpose and character of the use. In Sony, the majority categorically 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the absence of a productive use precluded the 
application of fair use.25 “Productive use” in this context means that the use leads to the 
19
 17 U.S.C. 107(1).
20 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994). 
21 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (unauthorized 
reproduction of copyrighted works in university course packs not fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v. 
Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 
22 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
23 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
24
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
25 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-972 (9th Cir., 1981).
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creation of a new work which results “in some added benefit to the public beyond that 
produced by the first author’s work.”26 According to the Ninth Circuit decision, 
convenience, entertainment and increased access were not purposes within the general 
scope of fair use.27 In Sony, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the 
productive/unproductive distinction could never be determinative of fair use.28
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Campbell substantially reintroduced the 
productivity requirement under another name – the key question now being whether the 
allegedly infringing use is “transformative.” Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, explained that the central purpose of the fair use investigation was to determine:
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original … or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether 
and to what extent the new work is transformative.29
For Justice Souter, transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”30 Accordingly, while
unproductive or untransformative uses are not to be presumptively denied fair use 
protection, the heart of the doctrine is reserved for “transformative” uses. The dominance 
26
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). (Blackmun dissent)
27
 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir., 1981).
28 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).
29 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). (internal quotes and citations omitted). See 
also, Pierre Leval, Towards A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
30 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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of the transformativeness test makes the actual statutory language regarding non-
commercial and educational uses largely irrelevant.31
Also, the extent to which a use is “transformative” is clearly a meta-factor: the 
extent to which a use transforms the work cannot be determined without reference to the 
other factors, such as the nature of the original work, the quantitative and qualitative 
similarity between the works and the effect of the use on the value of the original work. 
The merits and limitations of transformativeness are discussed in Part IV below. The 
purpose of the defendant’s use is still important, it is just as clearly a subjective 
determination. Bright-line distinctions, such as commercial/non-commercial and 
educational/non-educational, have been superceded by a much more ambiguous notion,
transformativeness. 
B. Nature Of The Copyrighted Work
The second factor considered by the courts in applying the fair use standard is 
“the nature of the copyrighted work.”32 Two aspects of the nature of the work are 
important to consider: whether the work is factual as opposed to creative; and whether the 
work is published or unpublished. 
In principle, the more creative the original work is, the more justification is 
required to establish a fair use in relation to it.33 Anecdotally, this aspect of the nature of 
31 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (Circuit Judge 
Merritt, dissenting).
32 17 U.S.C. 107(2). 
33 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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the work tends not to be r egarded as significant.34 The Supreme Court did not consider 
the creative nature of television programs or musical compositions to be an obstacle to a 
finding of fair use in Sony or Campbell. At the other end of the spectrum, the Second 
Circuit has held that the copying of one factual work by a rival was not protected by fair 
use.35 The second factor is especially unhelpful in cases involving parody, because 
parody is predicated on the existence of an antecedent creative work. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Campbell, in the context of parody, the second factor “is not much help ... 
in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats.”36
After the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Harper & Row v. Nation 
Enterprises,37 it briefly appeared that use of an unpublished work could almost never 
qualify as fair use.38 The Nation had published a 300 to 400-word extract of the soon-to-
be published memoirs of President Gerald Ford dealing with the Nixon pardon, 
preempting an article that was scheduled to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to 
purchase the exclusive right to print pre-publication excerpts of President Ford’s memoir; 
but as a result of the defendant’s article, Time canceled its agreement. The majority held
that “[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public 
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”39
34 According to Nimmer’s analysis, it actually has a negative correlation with the outcome. Nimmer, 
Fairest Of Them All, supra note 13, at 280.
35 Financial Information, Inc v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
36 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
37 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
38 Id. at 555.
39 Id. at 555.
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Two cases from the Second Circuit followed and enlarged this ruling. In Salinger 
v Random House, 40 the Second Circuit held that a literary biographer of reclusive author 
J.D. Salinger was not permitted to quote from a selection of Salinger’s unpublished 
letters and drafts. In New Era v Holt,41 the same court held that the quotation of 
unpublished material to establish a variety of critical assertions with respect to L. Ron 
Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, was equally unavailing on fair use grounds.42 In 
both cases the court held that unpublished works normally enjoy “complete protection 
against copying any protected expression.”43
In 1992 Congress revised Section 107 and made it clear that “[t]he fact that a 
work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors.”44 In light of Congress’ clarification of Section
107, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row is easier to reconcile as deriving 
from the fact that the work in question was soon-to-be published, not that it was 
unpublished.45 In any event, the nature of the copyrighted work remains unhelpful in 
assessing whether an activity is protected by fair use or not.
40 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987).
41 New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
42 Id.
43 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987); New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co.,
873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989). See also, Leval, supra note 29, at 1113.
44
 Amended 10/24/92 by Pub. L. No. 102-492.
45
 Leval, supra note 29, at 1120. Note that Judge Leval authored both the Salinger and New Era opinions 
overturned by the Second Circuit. Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d &
rem’d 811 F.2d 90, (2d Cir. 1987) and New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 
F. Supp. 1493 (D.N.Y., 1988) aff’d on other grounds 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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C. Amount And Substantiality Of The Portion Used
The third factor to be considered in adjudicating fair use is “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”46 The 
need for both a quantitative and a qualitative inquiry harks back to Justice Story’s 
original formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh.47 In that case, Justice 
Story was concerned to protect the “chief value of the original work” against the 
extraction of its “essential parts” through the mere “facile use of scissors” or its 
intellectual equivalent.48 In theory, the greater the portion of a work that is copied, the 
less inclined a court will be to find in favor of fair use. In practice, several cases 
confound this basic proposition, relying instead on subjective qualitative impressions or 
suppositions as to the value of the work. 
In Harper & Row, the defendant copied a mere 300 words from a 200,000-word 
manuscript, and yet the Supreme Court held that this constituted a substantial taking 
under the third factor.49 This extraordinary conclusion only makes sense in context of the 
Court’s manifest disapproval of the conduct of the defendant, particularly the manner in 
which it obtained access to an advance copy of the biography and its scoop of the Time 
magazine story. In Sony, the majority of the Supreme Court found that home videotaping 
entire programs for later viewing was fair use.50 In Campbell, the Supreme Court held 
46
 17 U.S.C. 107 (3).
47 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
48 Id. at 345.
49 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). The words were not 
even entirely sequential, see EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 155 (2000).
50 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
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that even though rap musicians 2 Live Crew had copied the heart of the original Roy 
Orbison song – the first line of lyrics and characteristic opening bass riff – nonetheless, 
the defendant’s appropriation could be protected by fair use.51 The Court reasoned that 
copying the heart of the song was excusable because it is the heart which most readily 
conjures up the song for parody, and also because it is the heart at which parody 
generally takes aim.52
The point to be understood is not that the amount of the work used is never 
significant; but rather that while the third factor provides a convenient platform for 
bolstering existing conclusions, it provides little ex ante guidance. The question of 
qualitative significance is inextricably tied with the fourth factor because each requires 
the court to assess the “value” of the original work. The third factor does not rely on 
mechanical quantification of the amount of the original work used, it asks courts to asses 
how much of the value of the original work is present in the later use. Similarly, the 
fourth factor asks what the effect of the later use is on the value of the original work. 
Thus both the third and forth factors require the determination of the antecedent question 
– the value of the work. In each case, the value of the original can only be determined 
with reference to scope of the copyright owner’s rights of exclusion; treating the statutory 
factors as outcome-determinative, as opposed to question-framing, ask us to believe the 
opposite is true. 
51 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
52 Id.
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D. Market Effect
The fourth statutory factor in fair use analysis is “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”53 In short, the fourth factor asks 
“what is the market effect of the unauthorized use?” It is worth exploring this factor in 
some detail, first because it is sometimes said to be the most important factor, 54 and 
second because questions of market effect dominate academic literature. Assessing the 
market effect of an unauthorized use confronts judges with a potential circularity: while 
their ultimate ruling defines the scope of the market, they are supposed to examine the 
market effect in making that ruling. In other words, they must make a ruling based on a 
finding that is contingent on their ruling. This theoretical circularity is mitigated by the 
reality that judges begin with a view as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s 
rights and then apply the statutory factors in a manner that transforms those priors into 
conclusions. 
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that analysis of market effect must include the 
effect on the copyright owner’s continued exploitation of existing markets and her 
potential exploitation of markets she is yet to enter.55 If unexploited markets were left to 
53
 17 U.S.C. 107(4).
54
 The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on fair use warns that the statutory factors are not to be 
treated in isolation, rather “[a]ll are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). But see, Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (fourth factor undoubtedly single most 
important element of fair use);and Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (factors not created equal, fourth factor at least primus inter pares). 
55
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593-594 (1994).
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fair users by default, copyright owners would find themselves in a race to exploit their 
works in as many markets as possible to preserve their future rights. The author of a 
novel would rush to make some token exploitation in every context imaginable; from the 
plausible (sequels, screen-plays, and television series) to the unlikely (soft toys, action 
figures, and private-label credit cards). 
Although considering potential and derivative markets is clearly necessary, it 
raises the problem that copyright owners can claim that almost any new use of their work 
is part of an unexplored derivative market. For example, although it had shown no 
interest in licensing a derivative of “Pretty Woman” in the rap genre before its lawsuit 
against 2 Live Crew, Acuff Rose (Roy Orbison’s publisher) argued that 2 Live Crew’s 
parody diminished its potential to do so. The Supreme Court lent credence to these kinds 
of argument by remanding the case in Campbell to the district court to determine whether 
the 2 Live Crew parody had dampened the potential demand for non-parody derivatives 
of the original song in the rap genre, a market hitherto unexplored by the copyright 
owner.56
The uncertainty of the original work’s potential market necessitates defining the 
limits of that market in order to ascertain whether the allegedly infringing use has any 
effect on it. This encourages a kind of circular reasoning: findings of fair use are 
premised on narrow market definitions; while denials of fair use are premised on 
expansive market definitions. The reasoning is circular because although the fair use 
56 Id. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to hear evidence as to the likely effect on the 
market for a non-parody, rap version of original song. It is puzzling to consider what evidence the Court 
thought would be produced, see 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05.
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question determines the extent of the market, the extent of the market also determines the 
outcome of the fair use question. 
Two cases concerning photocopying illustrate the potential circularity of 
examining the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. In 
both Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,57 and American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco,58 academic journal publishers alleged that their copyrights were infringed by 
defendants making unauthorized photocopies of journal articles for medical and scientific 
research. The two cases, decided almost 20 years apart, are barely distinguishable on their 
core facts, and yet reach entirely opposite conclusions. 
The difference between the cases lies in the latter court’s willingness to find that 
the publisher suffered an adverse market effect. The Court of Claims in Williams & 
Wilkins held that the evidence on the record failed to show that the defendant’s 
photocopying practices caused a significant detriment to the plaintiff. In American 
Geophysical, the Second Circuit also concluded that, based on potential sales of 
additional journal subscriptions, back issues, and back volumes alone, the evidence of an 
adverse market effect was weak.59 However, the majority of the Second Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on the fourth factor because of the availability of 
licensing facilitated through the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”).60 The majority 
found that through this collection organization, the publishers had created “a workable 
57 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (Ct. Cl., 1973) aff’d by equally divided Court, 
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
58 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir., 1994).
59 Id. at 928.
60 Id. at 929.
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market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies 
of individual articles via photocopying.”61 In the opinion of the majority, the potential 
licensing revenues that would be forgone by publishers if a finding of fair use was made 
itself constituted an adverse market effect under the fourth factor.
Any copyright owner who loses an infringement action because of a finding of 
fair use has also lost at least one potential licensee, although in some cases the prospects 
of a license are more theoretical than real.62 The majority in American Geophysical
argued its reliance on potential licensing revenues was not circular because:
[o]nly an impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or 
likely to be developed markets should be legally cognizable when evaluating a 
secondary use's effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.63
However, the addition of the “traditional, reasonable, or likely” requirement does not 
entirely mitigate the problem of circular reasoning. Determining whether a market is 
“traditional, reasonable, or likely” is indistinguishable from determining the scope of the 
copyright holder’s rights: both require courts to make an a priori assumption and then 
compare that assumption to the conduct of the defendant. The Second Circuit comes 
close to transparency in American Geophysical by at least identifying the assumption that 
61 Id. at 930.
62 In several prominent cases it appears that the plaintiffs were unwilling to license at any price, whereas, 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell a settlement including an ongoing license was in fact 
negotiated. See for example, Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987); New Era 
Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989), Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random 
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir., 1966); and Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir., 2000). 
63
 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir., 1994) (emphasis added)
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it is making – that journal photocopying falls within the traditional, reasonable, and likely 
to be developed market of the copyright owner – but it does little to actually justify this 
assumption. 
Such assumptions should be carefully considered, especially in the context of 
market effect, because of the danger that courts will reason backwards from the fact of 
marketability to the construct of property.64 The CCC was established in 1977 to license 
photocopying after the decision in Williams & Wilkins.65 This begs the question: if a 
centralized clearinghouse was established to license parody, review or reference to a class 
of works, would it establish the existence of a “traditional,” “reasonable,” or “likely”
market for such activities?66 In Campbell, the Court held that there is no protectable 
derivative market for criticism, including parody because:
“[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of 
original works would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the 
64 Julie Cohen makes this criticism in relation to the INS case in which the Supreme Court found a quasi-
property right in news based on a misappropriation theory. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner In Cyberspace: The 
New Economic Orthodoxy Of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 507-508; see Int’l News Serv. 
v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
65
 It is tempting to speculate that had the CCC existed earlier, the decision in Williams & Wilkins would 
have been the same as American Geophysical. However, this seems unlikely. The Court of Claims 
considered and rejected the possibility of licensing schemes. In his dissenting opinion in American 
Geophysical, Justice Jacobs argued that the CCC scheme was “neither traditional nor reasonable; and its 
development into a real market is subject to substantial impediments.” American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir., 1994) (Jacobs J. dissent).
66 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir., 1994) (Jacobs J. dissent). See 
also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38-39.
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unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or 
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a 
potential licensing market.”67
If the members of the MPAA established a rights clearing center for reviews and parodies
of, and references to their movies, would unauthorized review, reference and parody 
suddenly cease to be fair use? There may be good reasons to not give copyright owners to 
expand control over certain uses of their works, even if they are offering to license those 
uses. 
As with the third factor, the fourth factor is conceptually important but 
incomplete. In order to determine market effect, a court must first form some idea as to 
what the market is, as emphasized by the Second Circuit’s holding that the market in 
question must be traditional, reasonable or likely to develop. The problem with the fourth 
factor, and with all the factors to some extent, is that they focus on second order 
questions and invite courts to gloss over the real basis for their rulings – how they came 
to define the boundaries of the copyright owner’s rights in the first place.68 To answer 
this antecedent question, courts must look beyond the statutory guidance in Section 107 
and confront theoretical questions about the nature of copyright. 
67 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (emphasis added).
68
 Lloyd Weinreb argues that although the Supreme Court cast its analysis in Sony and Harper & Row
almost entirely in terms of the statutory factors, “the application, not to say the interpretation, of the factors 
is so tailored to the circumstances of the cases, that one is impelled to look beneath the surface of the 
opinions for the true ground of decision.” Lloyd L. Weinreb, The 1998 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 
Fair Use, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1299. (1999).
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E. The Search For Reasons
The four statutory factors that courts must consider in deciding fair use cases 
provide a useful framework for analysis but they are far from complete. By mandating 
that all decisions in this area at least consider the factors, the statute generates more fine-
grained points of comparison. All other things being equal, this should make fair use 
decisions more consistent. However, judges need to recognize that the factors only 
provide a framework for their analysis by raising certain second order questions. 
Applying the factors still requires making first order assumptions as to the scope and 
value of the copyright owner’s rights. This is particularly true of the third and fourth 
factors, which require courts to first define the value of the copyrighted work, in order to
determine how much of the value of the work was used by the defendant, and also to 
determine how the value of the work was affected by the defendant’s use. Neither of 
these questions can be answered without first deciding what the value of the work is in 
the abstract, or how far the copyright owner’s rights in relation to it should extend. 
Courts inevitably fall back on assumptions as to what the legitimate scope of the 
copyright owners’ rights should be. More precise articulation and more coherent 
justification of those assumptions should lead to more predictable fair use decisions over 
time because, to the extent that judges agree on these first order considerations, clearer 
rules will emerge. Even where judges initially disagree, such disagreements will be 
resolved by the usual considerations of precedent. 
The remainder of this paper considers what kind of assumptions courts should be 
making in fair use cases. As Parts II and III elaborate, the fundamental starting point for 
the assumptions that fill the gaps in the statutory factors is an understanding of the 
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dynamic nature of modern copyright law and the structural role of fair use. Part IV 
examines the jurisprudential implications of the structural analysis of fair use and 
recommends that judges should justify their assumptions as to the proper scope of the 
copyright owner’s rights in terms of fundamental principles derived from copyright law 
itself. This bounded normative inquiry is more likely to result in stability and 
predictability than either a simple cost-benefit or unrestricted reference to normative 
conceptions of the good in general. 
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Part II – Copyright As An Evolving System
As noted in the previous part, the statutory formulation of the fair use doctrine 
raises significantly more questions than it answers. The indeterminacy of the statutory 
factors stems from congressional recognition of the need judicial policy making. Fair use 
is the mechanism by which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to 
judges, to allow copyright to adapt to ongoing social and technological change more 
effectively than a purely legislative response would allow. Doctrinal recommendations 
that do not take account of this structural role of fair use are necessarily limited in their 
descriptive of prescriptive analysis. Some of these attempts and their weaknesses are 
considered Part IV. Understanding the structural role of fair use in copyright law is the 
first step towards developing a more coherent fair use doctrine. This part examines the 
overall structure of modern copyright law as the context for understanding the structural 
role of fair use. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 can be seen as the culmination of the transformation 
of American copyright law, from the regulation of literal reproduction to a system of 
general rights which protects the more abstract notion of the value of creative and 
intellectual works.69 This transformation has greatly expanded the number of works 
covered by copyright, and the political and economic significance of the rights that 
copyright vests in authors and their assignees. Copyright’s transformation and associated 
expansion have been viewed with alarm by many in the academic community because of 
69 Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of Works: The Transformation Of American 
Copyright Law 1790 – 1909 (2004). (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University Law School) (on 
file with author).
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the perceived threat to free speech, innovation and creativity.70 The expansion of 
copyright has also been criticized as a victory for special interests – publishers, 
broadcasters, the recording industry and movie studios – over the generalized public 
interest in the free exchange of information.71
Without necessarily disputing any of these claims, this article tells another story 
about the significance of the changes in the structure of American copyright law. The 
effects of copyright law are prone to technological disruption. Even preceding the digital 
age, new technology such as the juke box and the photocopier conflicted with people’s 
settled expectations of the rights of copyright owners and the freedoms of the public. In 
1976, Congress decided to alter the structure of copyright law to make it more responsive 
to technological change. Congress replaced potentially limited and technologically 
specific rights with rights that were more broadly expressed, in order to allow copyright 
law to be more flexible in its treatment of new technologies.
The 1976 Act was a significant departure from its predecessor in a number of 
respects. Three changes greatly increased the number of works subject to copyright and 
the duration of copyright protection for those works. First, the new Act changed the 
default rule for the application of copyright, from opt-in to opt-out. Under the 1909 Act, 
an eligible work received no federal copyright protection until its publication, and even 
70
 See for example, Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2; Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice 
and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 173 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 
(1996).
71 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 53 (2001); and Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired, 
Jan. 1996, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html. 
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then only if certain formalities were observed.72 In contrast, the 1976 Act applies to all 
eligible works from the moment of their creation, although until 1989 it was still the case 
that a work published without the proper form of copyright notice would instantly 
become part of the public domain.73  Second, the new Act increased the maximum 
duration of copyright protection from 56 years from the date of publication, to the life of 
the author plus 50 years for most natural persons and 75 years from the year of first 
publication for anonymous works, pseudonymous works and works made for hire.74
Third, the new Act jettisoned the requirement of copyright renewal, thus extending 
copyright protection even more significantly for the vast majority of owners who failed to 
renew their terms after the initial 28 year period.75 The cumulative effect of these 
extensions was that more works were protected by copyright and that copyright 
protection lasted considerably longer. 
Although these changes are significant, there was a much more fundamental 
change to the nature of copyright itself: the broadening of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights. The 1976 Act significantly increased the scope of copyright owner’s 
rights by rephrasing them in considerably more general terms. 
72 The 1909 Act expressly allowed the state common law copyright to protect unpublished works.
73
 Jessica Litman, Sharing And Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2004). See for example, J. 
A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.Y., 1938) (copyright void for failure to 
comply with the formalities).
74
 17 USC 302. Extended to the life of the author plus 70 years and 95 years respectively by the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. 
75
 According to Lessig, renewal rates were so low in 1973 that the average term of copyright protection in 
was only 32.2 years. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 135. 
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The new Act gave copyright owners five “fundamental rights” to be offset against 
subsequent exceptions.76
The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in 
broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, qualifications, 
or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything in section 106 is 
made "subject to sections 107 through 118," and must be read in conjunction with 
those provisions.77
The contrast in drafting styles between the two Acts is significant. The 1909 Act granted 
rights that were static in nature and had to be constantly retrofitted by Congress.78
Public choice theory predicts that legislative outcomes will be the product of 
interest group competition in a political market place.79 In that political marketplace, 
small groups with concentrated interests will mobilize more effectively than large groups 
76
 The exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. See House 
Report No. 94-1476; 17 USC 106 (1) through (5). In 1995 Congress added the digital audio transmission 
right specifically reserved for sound recordings, 17 USC 106(6), Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
77 House Report No. 94-1476. 
78 The 1976 gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to: “(1) reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords; [and] (2) prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” In contrast to this 
general and technologically neutral language, the comparable section of the 1909 Act vests the following 
exclusive rights in copyright owners: “(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; 
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if 
it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other 
nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and 
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art.”
79
 See generally, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (1971).
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with diffuse interests. The application of public choice theory to the 1976 Act is fairly 
obvious: well represented copyright holders, such as the media, received a significant 
increase in both the scope and duration of protection; well represented copyright users
such as libraries received special treatment by way of exemptions; the unrepresented 
public discovered that their residual freedoms, and the public domain, had decreased 
accordingly.80
In her book, Digital Copyright, Jessica Litman provides a compelling and detailed 
account of the decades of protracted negotiation that that led to the passage of the 1976 
Act. Two related features stand out in this account: (1) revising the Copyright Act has 
proved difficult and time consuming; (2) special interest group representatives have had 
an unusually direct influence in drafting the new Copyright Act.
The first major revision of the Copyright Act in the 20th century was completed in 
1909; it took until 1976 to achieve another one. The intervening period witnessed the 
Depression, two world wars, and the invention of a variety of devices that would come to 
transform copyright, including : talking motion pictures, the radio tuner, television, the 
jukebox, the photocopier, the computer, videotape recorders and musical synthesizers. 
During this period, there were almost continual but unsuccessful efforts by both Congress 
and various interest groups to revise the 1909 Act in light of these developments. 
Litman offers a standard public choice explanation for the revised structure of the 
Copyright Act that was eventually passed in 1976: conflicts between represented interests 
80 Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. Peter Drahos tells the same story on a global scale concerning 
the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the adoption of the TRIPS agreement, see PETER 
DRAHOS, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2001). 
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were solved by increasing the surplus to be divided (by expanding copyright) at the 
expense of the greater public.81 The public choice account is convincing in its own terms, 
but it overlooks the considerable merit of adopting a dynamic copyright structure. To 
understand why this is so, and the significance for fair use, it is helpful to consider some 
of the literature on the choice between rules and standards.
In an ideal world, copyright law would accommodate at least three different 
constraints: incentive optimization, administrative efficiency and adaptability. First, the 
law would create sufficient incentives to encourage and sustain the production of 
society’s optimal level and quality of intellectual and creative output. Second, the rights 
established by that law would be sufficiently certain to allow them to be observed and 
enforced with minimal administrative and transaction costs. Finally, the law would adapt 
to social and technological change, so that it continued to comply with the optimization 
and administrative efficiency criteria. 
Obviously no such law exists. In fact, there is an inherent tension between the 
administrative efficiency criteria and adaptability criteria. In theory, laws that are more 
specific have a lower cost of administration, but that same specificity makes them more 
likely to produce undesirable or paradoxical results in response to unforeseen situations. 
In other words, specific laws are prone to obsolescence. At least three considerations 
govern the legislative choice to make laws more or less specific. First, although rules are 
associated with lower compliance costs, they are typically harder to write in the first 
place. In contrast, a legislative standard is easier to write but shifts costs from the law 
81 Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. 
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making body to those who must comply with the law because of both information costs 
and uncertainty.82
The second consideration in choosing between rules and standards is determining 
how the law should change in response to new circumstances. Laws which are 
dramatically affected by social and technological change must be regularly adapted to 
new circumstances. Received wisdom tells us that standards are easier to keep up-to-date
than rules.83 Standards do not require continual legislative intervention to adapt to 
changing circumstances because they are only given content through their application to 
particular situations. Accordingly, in spite of their increased compliance costs, standards 
may be preferable where the opportunities for legislative resolution are limited; this 
observation leads directly to the third consideration, public choice theory. 
As noted above, public choice theory holds that interest group competition affects 
legislative outcomes. An important extension of simple public choice theory also 
suggests that interest group competition in a multiple veto-point political system affects 
legislative style as well as policy direction.84 The active involvement of a number of 
interest groups with non-aligned or only partially aligned interests makes finding a 
specific compromise on any particular issue difficult. The more interest groups, the more 
difficult that prospect will be. In the U.S., building consensus is even more difficult 
because the complexity of the legislative process results in multiple veto points.85 The 
82 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
83 Id. at 617.
84 Tonja Jacobi, Explaining American Litigiousness, A Product Of Politics, Not Just Law (2004) (working 
paper, on file with author). 
85 Id.
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passage of legislation requires a majority in the relevant committees, the House, the 
Senate and Presidential approval. The more specific a bill is, the more difficult it is likely 
to be to secure all the required majorities. 
Obstacles to more specific legislation may have a compounding effect in an 
environment that is known to be prone to external shocks. The parties involved should 
anticipate that if legislation was difficult to pass initially, it will also be difficult to amend 
in response to unforeseen circumstances. A risk averse interest group might prefer 
incomplete legislation which transfers the forum of conflict from a one-shot legislative 
solution to an ongoing judicial process. Consistent with this theory, Attiyah and Summers 
have commented that Congress adopts incomplete policy instruments and relies on case 
law to determine the content of the law, more than other comparable nations.86
Incomplete legislation does not lead to anarchy: where Congress fails to act, 
courts fill the void, completing incomplete policies in a process that is only nominally 
interpretive.87 In spite of frequent references to ‘activist judges’ in political rhetoric, 
judicial policy making may arise as much from legislative abdication as from judicial 
usurpation. Indeed, there is a view that Congress routinely passes the task of resolving 
unpleasant political issues to the courts.88 For example, Congress could have resolved the
issue of home video taping through legislative action before the Supreme Court was 
86 P.S. ATTIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987), from p298.
87 Id. at 308. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 19 (1985). 
88
 E.g. Frank J. Macchiarola, The Courts in the Political Process: Judicial Activism or Timid Local 
Government? 9 ST. JOHN’S J. L. COMM. 703, 704 (1994).
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forced reach the issue in Sony; but the “chance to do nothing and blame it on another 
branch of government was predictably hard for Congress to resist.”89
In sum, where Congress knows that a specific policy provision would be initially 
difficult to draft, would be rapidly made obsolete by external changes, and would be 
difficult to rewrite in response to those changes, it may rationally (or expediently) choose 
to enact an incomplete policy, leaving it to the courts to add content to that standard by 
applying it to particular situations as they arise. Congress’ broad definition of the rights 
of copyright owners and its incomplete codification of the fair use doctrine both fit neatly 
with this description.
Congress’ intention in recasting the exclusive rights in such broad language in the 
1976 Act was to change the way copyright law dealt with new technology. Previously, 
courts had typically resisted extending copyright protection to new technologies without 
explicit legislative guidance.90 The adoption of broadly stated exclusive rights in the new 
Act was intended to “change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new 
technologies, as well as old.”91
The legislative history shows that Congress was aware of the extent to which the 
existing balance of copyright protection had been disrupted by past technologies, such as 
89 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 121 (rev’d 
ed. 2003).
90 See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo 
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), 
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
91 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457-458 (1984).
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the player piano and the photocopier.92 The congressional record also indicates that 
Congress realized that it was not in a position to anticipate the implications of social and 
technological changes yet to occur.93 Just as Congress was aware of the difficulty, ex 
ante, of specifying the application of copyright to technological developments, it was also 
aware of the unlikelihood that it would be able to respond ex post, in a manner that was 
either timely or effective.94 In short, Congress appears to have understood that any new 
copyright law would have to broadly expressed to allow it to respond dynamically to 
unforeseen events because the politics of copyright reform were such that its own ability 
to respond would be limited. The shift to a dynamic copyright regime, implemented in 
the 1976 Act, may have been the product of special interest politics, but it was also sound 
public policy in light of copyright’s susceptibility to technological change. 
One of the first technologies to put the 1976 Act to the test was the VCR. In 1984, 
the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of the VCR, Sony, was not liable for 
selling a machine that could lead to widespread reproduction of copyrighted materials.95
This ruling indicated to some that the courts would be unable or unwilling to adapt 
copyright to embrace new technology as Congress intended. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent criticized the majority on just that basis. 
92
 The revision effort leading up to the 1976 Act was “[s]purred by the recognition that significant 
developments in technology and communications had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate.” Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 463 (1984). S. REP. NO. 94-473, p. 47 (1975).
93 H. REP. NO. 94-1476; S. REP. NO. 94-473 (1975)
94 Id.
95 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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It is no answer, of course, to refer to and stress, … this Court's “consistent 
deference to Congress” whenever “major technological innovations” appear. 
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the Court has tended to 
evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of copyright law. I see no reason 
for the Court to be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it. Indeed, 
it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the 1976 Act that Congress meant 
to change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new technologies, 
as well as old.96
The majority stressed the importance of allowing Congress to determine the 
appropriate response to new technology throughout its decision.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned 
the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to 
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work 
product.
… 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected 
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have 
made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a 
flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible..97
However, the rhetoric of deference employed by the majority must be carefully 
assessed in light of its actual ruling. The majority did not find the Copyright Act 
inapplicable to the video cassette recorders; nor did it hold that new technology always 
required new legislation. What it did say was that under the current law, although other 
forms of reproduction using a VCR may have been infringing, non-commercial time-
shifting constituted a fair use of the new technology. The majority did apply the new Act 
96 Id. at 457-458
97 Id. at 429, 456 (1984). See also Id. at 431 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent 
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. 
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied 
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”)
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to the VCR as Congress intended, whether that application was the same as the one 
Congress might have made is another question altogether. 
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Part III – Fair Use In The Context Of An Evolving Copyright System 
One of the criticisms of the new copyright regime implemented in 1976 is that the 
interaction of broadly expressed exclusive rights with narrowly crafted exceptions has a 
ratcheting effect on copyright protection. The rights of copyright owner s adapt to 
technological challenges, whereas users’ rights are diminished or marginalized. This 
concern is particularly pronounced with respect to the possible effects of restrictive 
licensing and technological measures, such as digital rights management. The expectation 
that fair use should preserve the balance of copyright assumes there is one unique and 
identifiable balance to be preserved, it also assumes that the past is a better reflection of 
that balance than the present. If the function of fair use was to preserve users’ rights, or 
maintain the status quo, it would appear to be failing dismally. 
On the other hand, if the success of fair use is measured by the extent to which 
has enabled copyright law to smoothly adapt to new challenges, fair use is doing pretty 
well. Understanding fair use from a structural perspective tells us something more about 
fair use than is revealed by the observation of individual cases. The structure of the 
Copyright Act and the history of copyright law indicate that the true function of fair use 
is to enable copyright law to evolve in response to new challenges without necessitating 
legislative intervention. As this section elaborates, fair use is fundamentally different to 
the majority of other exceptions that limit the rights of copyright owners because it is 
both dynamic (unlike most exceptions) and contextual (unlike the idea expression 
distinction). Significantly, like the idea expression distinction, fair use is also a 
constitutionally required feature of copyright law. All of this makes fair use very 
significant. In addition, a structural analysis of fair use indicates that the doctrine is meant 
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to be used as a flexible standard through which the judiciary can determine the 
application of copyright in response to social and technological changes – fair use was 
never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of change. 
A. The Nature Of Fair Use
Unlike the most other exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, fair 
use is a dynamic standard. As a statement of legislative policy, the fair use doctrine is 
undeniably vague. Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that “the fair use of a 
copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright.” Section 107 also provides a non-
exclusive list of six examples of fair use (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research) and four non-
exclusive factors for courts to consider in applying the doctrine. The vagueness of the fair 
use provision stands in marked contrast to the specificity of many other sections of the 
Act, and it begs the question of why Congress adopted rules in some places and standards 
in others. 
The narrowness of the static exemptions is easily illustrated. The Act creates a 
statutory exemption allowing libraries to copy an existing published work to a new 
format if the existing format has become obsolete.98 There is no privilege to upgrade to a 
format that is merely superior or more convenient, and persons other than libraries have 
no such express right at all. Many other exemptions follow a similar pattern, applying 
only to a particular special interest and only with respect to a limited class of conduct. 
The Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) of 1992 demonstrates the limitations 
of the Act’s many static exemptions. The AHRA reflects a deal between music industry 
98 17 USC 108(c).
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interests and device manufacturers. Under that deal, device manufactures agreed to pay 
royalties for, and include technological limitations in, digital audio recording devices.99
In return for these royalties and technological restrictions, music industry interests 
consented to a provision in the Copyright Act which immunizes noncommercial copying 
using a digital audio recording device or a digital audio recording medium.100
The AHRA was a static and narrow solution to a particular problem, Congress 
could have legislated as to the legality of consumer home audio copying more generally,
but failed to do so. The AHRA has no application to a consumer who converts CDs to 
MP3 files, nor do the royalty provisions apply to MP3 players.101 Consequently, the 
AHRA amendments to the Copyright Act have been entirely inconsequential in the public 
furor that has surrounded MP3s, file-sharing and webcasting in the past few years. As the 
AHRA illustrates, in a fast-changing environment, even detailed rules that perfectly 
address a group’s concerns tend to ultimately fail in that aim.
Unlike the idea expression distinction, fair use contextual. This difference has 
important implications. The idea expression distinction is dynamic and universal in its 
application. The idea expression distinction, which holds that “no author may copyright 
his ideas or the facts he narrates,”102 is one of the fundamental axioms of copyright law. 
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information contained in an 
99
 Goldstein, supra note 89, at 132. 
100
 The provision does not make this conduct non-infringing per se, rather it cannot form the basis of an 
action for copyright infringement, 17 USC 1008.
101 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 1999).
102
 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 17 U.S.C. 102(b). 
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author’s work, it merely protects the expression of those ideas and information.103 The 
idea expression distinction is not an exemption from copyright, it is statement of one of 
its inherent limitations in scope.104
The idea expression distinction is very important but it is not the appropriate 
vehicle to resolve every tension in copyright, because it does not contextualize. For 
example, the idea expression distinction does not provide a means to distinguish between 
the partial copying of a work for an academic or critical purpose and the same conduct 
for some less-favored purpose. Nor can it be used to take account of the difference 
between private use and non-private use. The idea expression distinction focuses solely 
on the alleged copying in question; it does not take into account the circumstances, 
effects and motivations surrounding that copying.105 Thus the idea expression distinction 
protects a computer programmer who copies an application protocol interface (“API” ) to 
enable her program to interface with the original, but it does not protect the copying of 
the entire program that was part of the reverse engineering process that uncovered the 
API in the first place.106 However, reverse engineering is protected by fair use.107
103
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-219 (2003).
104
 17 USC 102(b). Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets out the subject matter of copyright and also states 
that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”
105
 This follows under either the ordinary observer test, or a more structured inquiry, Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (observer test for substantial similarity); Computer Assocs. 
Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir., 1992) (abstraction, filtration comparison test for substantial 
similarity).
106 See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000). 
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
40
The difference between the idea expression distinction and fair use is particularly 
important to understand because the two are so often confused.108 An example of the 
confusion between the idea expression distinction and fair use is the mode of criticism 
directed at a series of admittedly problematic cases. In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 
Carol Publishing Group, Inc., a district court held that The Joy of Trek, a guidebook for 
the Star Trek uninitiated, infringed the copyright in the original series.109 In Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit held that The 
Seinfeld Aptitude Test, literally a sequence of hundreds of trivia questions and answers 
relating to the Seinfeld series, also infringed the copyright in the original series.110 In each 
case the amount of expression from any individual broadcast or the series in total was 
slight and fragmentary, but remarkably the courts had little trouble characterizing the 
guide book and the aptitude test as substantially similar to the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work. A number of scholars, such as Matthew Bunker,111 have characterized these 
107 Id.
108
 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (defense of fair use often invoked without reference to the particular 
use employed by the defendant, and merely as an alternative label for similarity that is not infringing 
because it is not substantial).
109 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
110 Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) .
111
 Matthew Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The "Transformative" Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 Comm. L. & 
Pol’y 1, 10 – 16. Bunker also criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s Dr. Seuss opinion on the same grounds. Id. But 
that case may have been soundly decided based on the similarities between the defendant’s back cover 
illustration and the plaintiff’s book, as opposed to “similarities in typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or 
visual style.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir., 1997).
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decisions as misapplications of the fair use doctrine. These decisions are extraordinary, 
but not primarily by virtue of their failure to find fair use. 
In these cases, courts appear to have mischaracterized as derivative works, works 
that simply reference but do not reproduce the plaintiffs’ copyrighted material. If we 
suspend disbelief and assume that, the work of the defendants in these cases was indeed 
substantially similar to that of the plaintiffs, and that the extent of that similarity was 
significantly more than was required for their analysis or criticism of the original, then 
the courts were correct to find in favor of the plaintiffs. The courts in Paramount and 
Castle Rock appear to have confused potential profit for protectable interest. The mere 
fact that the defendant was attempting to profit by catering to the significant public 
interest in Seinfeld and Star Trek does not establish any protectable similarity between 
books discussing the television programs and the programs themselves. 
Fair use has a significant structural role in copyright, relying on fair use to make 
up for erroneous decisions on whether there was presumptively actionable copying in the 
first place can only further distort and confuse fair use analysis. Fair use is structurally 
unique among all the limitations and exception to copyright rights, because it is both 
dynamic and contextual.  The Structural role of fair use does not include playing catcher 
every time a judge misses the ball. 
B. The Roles Of Fair Use
Given the 1976 Act’s grant of expansive and pervasive copyright rights, fair use 
has a role to play in maintaining a constitutionally acceptable balance between copyright 
and freedom of speech. This role warrants brief description but is well understood. What 
is less recognized but equally important is fair use’s structural role within copyright. The 
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First Amendment provides that in part that Congress “shall make no law… abridging the 
freedom of speech.”112 As a consequence, government restrictions on speech, such as 
laws against flag burning,113 and private law actions that effect speech, such as libel,114
are greatly restricted by the First Amendment. Copyright is a federal law that restricts 
speech by creating an exclusive property right in original expression contained in a 
tangible medium, albeit for a limited time. The possibility that copyright has a harmful 
effect on freedom of speech has increased because of the expansion of copyright 
ownership as discussed in the previous section. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that copyright does not present a danger to freedom of speech because 
of the idea expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, copyright’s “own speech-
protective purposes and safeguards.”115
Fair use serves an important constitutional role in maintaining a balance between 
establishing incentives for the creation of works and guaranteeing sufficient access to 
those works to preserve a constitutionally acceptable level of freedom of speech. 
However, as Rebecca Tushnet observes, it would be a mistake to simply equate the scope 
of fair use with the scope of freedom of speech required by the constitution – the two 
112 USCS Const. Amend. 1.
113
 Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
114 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
115 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-219 (2003). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 - 558 (1985).
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concepts are interrelated but they are not coterminous.116 More is required of fair use than 
simply satisfying the requirements of the First Amendment. 
Fair use turns out to be the final arbiter of the rights of the copyright owner in a 
broad range of situations. Current and recently decided fair use cases have asked courts in 
various jurisdictions to determine whether and to what extent:
• a defendant was entitled to base a test preparation on a copyrighted reference 
book;117
• a large computer hardware manufacturer was entitled to copy illustrations and 
phrases from a guide to computer injury prevention for use in its own from 
safety guide;118
• a city police department was entitled to display a criminal defendant’s 
photographs in the course of its investigation;119
• a hip-hop magazine was entitled to copy and distribute the early unpublished 
works of a prominent recording artist to expose his alleged racism;120
• a public interest group was entitled to publish a private company’s internal 
emails relating to its electronic voting machines, to inform the public about 
alleged problems associated with those electronic voting machines;121 and 
116
 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). Tushnet argues that fair use alone may not be enough to clear 
copyright of all First Amendment concerns.
117 Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir., 2004).
118 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir., 2004).
119 Shell v. City of Radford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190 (D. Va., 2005).
120 Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 (D.N.Y., 2004).
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• a defendant was entitled to publish a book containing its own photographs of 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted Beanie Babies.122
It seems unlikely that any consistent theme will emerge from the ultimate 
disposition or settlement of these cases. Nonetheless, these cases are conceptually linked. 
In each case the broad statement of the rights of the copyright owner set out in the 
Copyright Act is incomplete – it does not by itself determine the ability of the copyright 
owner to control the use of his or her work. 
While others have suggested that fair use should be seen as more than “a 
grudgingly tolerated exception to the copyright owner’s rights of private property,” 123
typically these explanations stop short with the observation that the exclusive rights can 
not be absolute. 124 Once that point is conceded, it still remains to be answered why fair 
use is necessary in addition to the specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses and 
the idea expression distinction. 
Indeed, fair use is not a necessary or inevitable feature of copyright law in the 
abstract – it is nonetheless a fundamental principle of the our copyright law today. In 
theory, the role played by fair use in limiting the rights of copyright owners could be 
performed by specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses, or a more concrete 
statement of rights in the first place. Alternatively or in addition, we could rely on high 
enforcement costs, private ordering solutions and norms of forbearance and reciprocity to 
moderate any adverse effects of overbroad copyright protection. 
121 Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Cal., 2004).
122 Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (D. Ill., 2004). 
123
 Leval, supra note 29, at 1135- 1136.
124 Id. at 1136.
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In spite of the theoretical possibility of copyright without fair use, copyright law 
has in fact developed a fundamental role for the doctrine. From its inception, the fair use 
doctrine has facilitated the expansion of copyright by providing a flexible limiting 
principle that defines the outer limits of the copyright owners’ rights.125 As discussed in 
the previous section, in 1976 Congress again significantly expanded the rights of 
copyright owners by rephrasing their exclusive rights in broad technologically neutral 
terms. At the same time, Congress transferred significant policy making responsibility to
the courts by incorporating fair use as a flexible standard in the 1976 Act. It is not a 
coincidence that Congress chose to codify fair use as a standard at the same time that it 
radically expanded copyright rights in the 1976 Act. 
On an operational level, findings of fair use establish both limits on the rights of 
copyright owners and affirmative rights in the hands of users. However, it would be a 
mistake to view the function of fair use as restraining copyright owners or empowering 
users for its own sake. Structurally, fair use transfers significant policy making 
responsibility to the judiciary, allowing judges to develop the law in response to external 
changes. This structural role of fair use is significant because of the perceived inability of 
the legislative process to keep pace with the demands of rapid technological and social 
changes. A flexible forward looking set of owner’s rights, combined with a flexible fair 
use doctrine, allows Congress to legislate less frequently and entrust significant policy 
responsibility to the judiciary.
Judicial policy making may trouble those bound up in literalist theories of 
democracy, but it is not without precedent. Courts exert a significant policy making role 
125 Sub- section C.1. explains the origins of fair use in more detail.
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in other areas, such as antitrust law. The fair use doctrine requires courts to determine the 
limits of the copyright monopoly and adapt copyright law in response to both incremental 
changes and external shocks.126 The role of fair use is especially significant given the 
impact of new technology on copyright.
This is not meant to convey the impression that Congress has somehow limited its 
capacity to provide legislative solutions to the questions raised by new technology. On 
the contrary, Congress can and should continue to play an active role in the development 
of copyright law. What it does mean is that Congress does not need to rush to legislative 
solutions and that it need not fear that its inaction will bring the system to grinding halt. 
There are two aspects to the structural role of fair use. First, fair use provides the 
flexible and dynamic boundary on copyright rights that makes their expansive and 
flexible definition feasible. Second, a flexible and dynamic copyright system necessitates 
giving judges significant policy making power over both the application of copyright 
rights and the fair use doctrine. Congress could have relied on specific codified 
exceptions to the exclusive rights instead of a dynamic fair use standard. However, 
specific exceptions face the same problems as specific owner’s rights – they require 
constant revision in the face of social and technological changes affecting copyright. The 
rationale for broad and dynamic exclusive rights is equally applicable fair use, flexibility 
requires delegation. Realistically, Congress is institutionally incapable of legislating on 
copyright with the frequency that would be demanded under a system with more specific 
126
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). (“The fair use doctrine thus permits and 
requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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rights and exemptions due to the daily changes in the environment in which those rights 
are exercised. 
Structurally, fair use is both a point of flexibility within copyright and a 
mechanism of delegation. Copyright protection has lengthened, broadened and deepened 
as a result of the 1976 Act; fair use cannot be expected to counteract these reforms, its 
role is to adapt the law Congress has made to society’s changing needs. 
C. The Effect of the Structural Role Of Fair Use on Copyright Owners
Fair use has been characterized as a “tax” on copyright owners, a “subsidy” in 
favor of particular groups,127 and a fundamental right of the public in relation to 
copyrighted works.128 All of these characterizations miss the mark because of their focus 
on the case-by- case operation of the fair use doctrine, as opposed to its overall structural 
function. 
Fair use is more than sum total of winners and losers of particular cases; from a 
structural perspective, fair use provides a point of flexibility in copyright law that 
facilitates adjustment to unforeseen changes. One implication of fair use’s structural role 
is that that it advantages copyright owners as a class. The claim that fair use systemically 
advantages copyright owners is not susceptible to empirical proof: it relies on comparison 
with a non-existent world in there was no fair use doctrine as we know it today. In order 
to make the case that fair use advantages copyright owners, I examine the origins of the 
127 Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-
Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); See Cohen, supra note 64 at footnote 5 for other 
similar references.
128
 DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function On The Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 212 (1998).
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
48
doctrine in the 19th century and the application of fair use today in the debate over private 
sphere uses of copyrighted works. 
1. The Origins Of Fair Use 
The fair use doctrine emerged as part of copyright’s shift in focus in the 19th
century, from an economic privilege of the printing industry to a system of rights 
centered around an abstract notion of authorship.129 In the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, copyright in both England and the U.S. was confined to “the sole right and 
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” protected works such as books, 
maps and charts.130 In spite of the nominal switch from printer’s monopoly to author’s 
right achieved by the Statute of Anne in 1710, copyright remained firmly rooted in the 
practices and technology of printing until the mid-1800s.131 In the early 1800s, copyright 
infringement was limited to verbatim reproduction, or replication with only colorable 
changes made merely to evade the copyright owner’s rights.132
129 Bracha, supra note 69.
130
 U.S. Copyright Act 1790, Section 1. (Protected matter itself limited to maps, charts and books). English 
law was similar at the time. Loren, supra note 66, 13.
131
 The simplicity of this general characterization is not intended to deny the existence of a more complex 
historical process or suggest that this transformation was entirely even. For a more detailed account, see 
Bracha, supra note 69.
132
 See Loren, supra note 66,13-15; Bracha, supra note 69, at 36; See Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 143, 26 
Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.1740). In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough declared, “[the presence of] part of 
the work of one author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man 
may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of another’s labors for the promotion of 
science, and the benefit of the public.” Cary v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1802) (emphasis added) (spelling 
modernized).
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In 1839 in Gray v. Russell, Justice Story signaled his view that copyright 
infringement should extend well beyond verbatim and evasive reproduction, in order to 
protect the “quintessence” of the work and its economic value, not just the owner’s 
interest in printing. 133 Justice Story began this expansion in Gray v. Russell by qualifying 
the previously understood position that an abridgment of an existing work did not 
constitute infringement, a proposition that in Justice Story’s words “must be received 
with many qualifications.”134
Two years later in the case of Folsom v. Marsh,135 Justice Story was able to 
further articulate the substance of those qualifications, giving rise to what would become 
known as the fair use doctrine. Justice Story ruled that to determine whether a selection 
from a copyrighted work constituted copyright infringement courts must:
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.136
This formulation not only encapsulated the fair use doctrine prior to its codification in the 
1976 Copyright Act, but the influence of Justice Story’s summary also remains 
discernible in the statute’s four factors which dominate judicial analysis of fair use 
today.137
Both Gray and Folsom cast the rights of the copyright owner in terms of the 
market value of the work in question, as opposed to narrow rights of literal or evasive 
133 Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
134 Id.
135
 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
136
 Id. at 348.
137
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
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reproduction. The centrality of market value in Justice Story’s abstraction of the 
protected work is manifest. In Gray v. Russell he explained the need to protect the work,
both from extracts that sought to “supersede the original work under the pretence of a 
review,” and abridgments which “by the omission of some unimportant parts… prejudice 
or supersede the original work” or compete with the original in “the same class of 
readers.”138 These points were reiterated in Folsom v. Marsh:
It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the original 
work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held to be such 
an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and 
intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of 
the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the 
original work.139
Fair use was not only coincident with this significant expansion in the rights of 
copyright owners, it was the fundamental doctrinal tool facilitating that expansion. 
During the 19th century, copyright began to outgrow literalism and refocused around a 
broader and more conceptually challenging notion of the work as an abstract object with 
economic value. Before fair use, copyright owners’ rights were narrowly defined and the 
public at large retained a broad freedom to, among other things, extract and abridge 
existing works. Fair use enabled a significant expansion of owners’ rights by establishing
a limiting principle that subordinated the public’s interest in the use copyrighted works to 
the owner’s economic interests; an irony that is often lost on modern observers.140 Fair 
use is seen as a limitation on the rights of copyright owners, but it actually serves a 
structurally expansive role in relation to those rights. 
138
 Gray v Russell, Id. At 1038. 
139 Folsom v Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (citations omitted).
140 Bracha, supra note 69.
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2. Fair Use And Private Sphere Activity
Operationally, fair use may appear to benefit members of the public by limiting 
the rights of copyright owners; nonetheless, structurally, fair use advantages copyright 
owners as a class by allowing their rights to be more expansively defined a priori. This
tension between the structural and operational aspects of the fair use doctrine continues
into the present day. The structural role of fair use in this regard can be seen most readily 
in relation to the regulation of the use of copyrighted material in the private sphere. In the 
domestic context, fair use has been effectively used by the courts to develop copyright 
law with more subtlety than Congress could have conceivably achieved legislating before 
the fact, and possibly even after. This illustrates the interrelationship between fair use’s 
two structural roles. First, fair use is the flexible counter-weight that enables flexible 
copyright rights. Second, that flexibility is achieved by congressional delegation of 
substantial policy making responsibility to the judiciary. The flexible design of both the 
exclusive rights and of fair use require judges to adapt copyright to changing 
circumstances, rather than waiting for congressional guidance which may never arrive. 
The extent to which copyright owners can regulate the use of copyrighted material 
in the private sphere is one of the most compelling and enduring issues in modern 
copyright law. Traditionally, copyright owners have exercised very limited rights with 
respect to use of their works in the home for a number of reasons: lack of commercial 
significance of those uses, uncertainty as to the application of the rights, and practical 
difficulties in enforcement. According to Litman, the scope of allowable copying in the 
private sphere received little explicit attention in the revision process for the 1976 Act.141
141 Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71, at 52. 
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
52
Congress’ failure to say anything on the legality of private copying has been roundly
criticized, but unfairly so.142 Congressional silence on the issue has in fact allowed the 
law relating to private copying to develop in a more nuanced fashion than would have 
been possible if Congress had acted more decisively. 
Presumably, when the last major revision to Copyright Act was finally passed in 
1976, Congress would have been aware that issues would arise in relation to the private 
use of copyrighted material.143 Given that awareness, Congress was faced with several 
choices: (1) make private use expressly immune from copyright; (2) make private use
expressly subject to copyright; (3) try to specify which private uses were immune to 
copyright, leaving the remainder subject to copyright; (4) conversely, try to specify which 
private uses were subject to copyright, leaving the remainder immune to copyright; or (5) 
do nothing and leave it to the courts to determine. As discussed in Part I, in drafting the 
1976 Act, Congress was unusually sensitized to its own inability to predict the how 
technological change would effect the balance between copyright owners and the public. 
As part of the dynamic structure adopted in 1976, Congress opted by omission to leave 
questions relating to the private use of copyrighted material to the courts to resolve by 
142
 Litman criticizes the omission because it has allowed regulation of private copying. Id.. Goldstein takes 
the opposite view and comments that “[t]he silence of Congress on the issue of private copies has left a 
black hole in the centre of American copyright legislation.” Goldstein, supra note 89, at 107. 
143
 See, for example, the exchange between Representative Beister and the Assistant Register of Copyrights 
in relation to off-the-air recording by consumers. June, 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 445 (D. Cal., 
1979)
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applying the fair use doctrine. Doing so was the only practical solution given Congress’ 
preference for expansive and dynamic exclusive rights.
If Congress had take option 1 in 1976 and exempted private copying of 
copyrighted works from copyright liability, it would have done so in total ignorance of 
the potential effects of this choice. In 1976, Congress could not have realized the 
potential of personal computers and other devices linked via non-commercial peer-to-
peer networks to displace commercial distribution of music, film, television, video 
games, and books.144 It is now apparent that unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing of 
copyrighted works is unlawful, regardless of whether it is non-commercial or takes place 
purely within the privacy of private homes or college dormitories. Unlike unauthorized 
home video recording for the purpose of time-shifting, unauthorized file-sharing is not 
fair use.145 The Supreme Court is currently considering under what circumstances the 
distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software may be held liable for uses of their 
software that infringe third party copyrights.146 Some commentators argue that 
unauthorized file-sharing should be treated as fair use, or else covered by some form of 
compulsory license.147 Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ first draft of the Sony decision took 
144 Goldstein, supra note 89, at 106. 
145 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir., 2001) (unauthorized P2P file-sharing not fair 
use); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir., 2004) (direct infringement by 
users of P2P file-sharing service undisputed.)
146 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (certiorari granted).
147 Raymond S. Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital 
Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (fair use); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial 
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 1 (2003) (compulsory license), 
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the view that the exclusive rights of copyright owners had no application in the private 
sphere as a matter of statutory interpretation.148 However, since Sony, drawing any kind 
of bright-line distinction between public and private has become increasingly problematic 
because of the increased capacity of private individuals to rip, mix, burn and most 
importantly, file-share. 
On the other hand, if Congress had adopted option 2 and made no allowance for 
the private use of copyrighted material, the resulting law would have been both 
extraordinarily oppressive and unpopular. First, Congress probably could not have 
anticipated that the exclusive reproduction right it bestowed on copyright owners would 
be effectively transformed into an exclusive use right in the digital context. Consider that 
the user of a book simply picks it up and begins to read; whereas, the equivalent activity 
in a digital medium requires first making a copy in random access memory of a 
computer.149 It is seems unlikely that the public could be expected to tolerate this radical 
expansion of copyright without some assurance that their rights to use copyrighted 
material in the ways they had always used it would not be too greatly effected. Fair use 
provides that assurance, albeit somewhat uncertainly at the margins. 
Second, on their face, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are infringed by 
any number of seemingly harmless private activities . Examples include: time-shifting 
broadcast television (copying); converting music on CD into a format compatible with a 
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT
(2004) (same). 
148
 Goldstein, supra note 89, at 122. 
149
 See, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 2-8 Nimmer 
on Copyright § 8.08. 
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
55
portable device (also copying); 150 and singing “Happy Birthday To You” at a restaurant
open to the public (public performance).151 That these examples do not constitute 
copyright infringement illustrates a more general principle: the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners are not absolute, their application varies according to the context.152
The blanket solutions of option 1 and option 2 are infeasible; what of options 3 
and 4? To some extent, Congress has pursued option 3 in an attempt to strike a balance 
between the interests of owners and the public in relation to private use of copyrighted 
150
 There is considerable debate over whether time shifting and format shifting are in fact harmless, but it is 
safe to say most people think they are. See Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, File-
sharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, July 2003 (finding that 67% of Internet users 
who download music don’t care whether the music they download is copyrighted), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf. Even the Recording Industry 
Association of America acknowledges that consumers are entitled to make copies of their own CDs for 
personal use on computers and portable music players. Presumably, the fair use doctrine is the source of 
that entitlement. See the RIAA website at http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited 
May 11, 2004) (on file with author). 
151
 The Copyright Act only gives copyright owners an exclusive right to the public performance of a 
musical work, however, the statutory definition of when a work is performed “publicly” appears broad 
enough to include a restaurant so long as it is “open to the public” or “a substantial number of persons 
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances” can gather there. 17 USC 101. Whether 
“Happy Birthday To You” is in fact still subject to copyright is subject to some uncertainty, see Litman, 
Sharing, supra note 73, at 50, and footnote 111; Scott M. Martin, The Mythology Of The Public Domain: 
Exploring The Myths Behind Attacks On The Duration Of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 
322, footnote 61 (2002).
152 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (the law has never 
recognized an author’s right to absolute control of his work).
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material, by specifying some activities as non-infringing.153 However, these specific 
exemptions represent only a small fraction of the what the public is in fact entitled to do 
with copyrighted material in the private sphere.154 As discussed earlier, the obsolescence
of the AHRA illustrates the difficulties of effectively addressing these issues before they 
occur and the likelihood that existing solutions quickly become stale in the context of 
fast-changing technology and consumer behavior.155 Clearly, the limitations that affect 
option 3 apply with at least equal force to option 4, but the consequences may even 
greater because of the different default rule. 
In the majority of cases, instead of attempting to specify the circumstances in 
which private uses would or would not constitute copyright infringement, Congress has 
“taken the fifth” and left it to the courts to make that determination on a case-by- case 
basis by applying the fair use doctrine . 
Judges are of course entitled to question the wisdom of congressional delegation, 
both in relation to private sphere copying and more generally. Nonetheless, until 
Congress enacts more detailed policy, judges are stuck with making most of the hard 
decisions. The question is, how should they make them?
153
 For example, 17 USC 117 authorizes the owner of a copy of a computer program to make a copy or 
adaptation of the program as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program, subject to certain 
limitations. The same section also authorizes an archival copy. 
154
 In addition to the fair use examples already mentioned in this paper, it should be noted that “[n]o license 
is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.” Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975).
155
 See notes 100 – 102 and accompanying text, supra. 
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As discussed in Part I, the four factors contained in the statutory elaboration of the 
fair use doctrine should be seen as question-framing as opposed to outcome-
determinative. Congress has given the courts a framework for deciding fair use cases, 
however it is still the responsibility of the courts to determine the scope of the copyright 
owner’s rights in particular situations. This explains one half of the structural role of fair 
use, that it is a standard that shifts policy making responsibility from the legislature to the 
judiciary.
Structurally, the flexible and dynamic nature of fair use renders it both the 
counter-weight to, and the enabler of, the equally flexible and dynamic exclusive rights 
of copyright owners. The structural role of fair use allows the judiciary to adapt copyright 
law in response to new technologies or other external forces. This is especially significant 
given the broad expression of copyright owners’ exclusive rights in the 1976 Act, and the 
increased breadth and duration of copyright protection brought about by the abandonment 
of formalities such as copyright registration, notice and renewal. 
One of the more interesting implications of the structural role of fair use is that 
fair use actually benefits copyright owners as a class by facilitating a more expansive 
definitions of their rights. This suggests that judges should disregard theories that view 
fair use as merely a tax on copyright owners, or an ad hoc redistribution of entitlements. 
It also suggests that judges need to carefully consider the allocation of the burden of 
proof in where the defendant raises fair use as a defense to copyright infringement. The 
jurisprudential implications of the structural role of fair use are considered in the next 
section.
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Part IV – Jurisprudential Implications
Judges can not avoid making copyright policy in fair use cases . As discussed in 
the preceding sections, the indeterminacy of the statutory fair use factors, and the 
reluctance (or inability) of the legislature to enact specific rules in response technological 
and social changes affecting copyright, necessitates that judges fill in the substantial gaps 
in copyright law. 
How should judges make sense of the jumble of case law and theory of the last 
200 years? The preceding structural analysis of fair use suggests that Congress has 
decided that the indeterminacy of a flexible fair use standard is preferable to the potential 
rigidity of anything more specific. The Supreme Court has also stressed the benefits of 
flexibility in its admonition to avoid the application of bright-line rules in fair use.156
Given this indeterminacy, how can judges decide fair use cases in a principled and non-
arbitrary way?
A comprehensive survey of the literature addressing this question is beyond the 
scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is possible to parse the majority of the literature into 
three different schools of thought: the cost -benefit analysis school; the external normative 
framework school; and the internal normative framework school. The meaning of these 
labels will become apparent shortly. 
A. Existing Approaches to Determining Fair Use
The essence of a cost-benefit analysis approach to fair use is a comparison of the 
costs versus the benefits of allowing the unauthorized use to continue. However, this 
simple statement belies the complexity and diversity of opinions as to exactly how such a 
156
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
59
test might be implemented. Wendy Gordon, for example, proposes that a finding of fair 
use should be conditioned on the presence of market failure and a cost-benefit analysis 
that indicates a net gain in social value in allowing the unauthorized use to continue.157 In 
contrast to Gordon, Glynn Lunney proposes a pure form of cost-benefit analysis without 
the filter of market failure. 158 Elsewhere I have undertaken a detailed examination of 
competing law and economics analyses of fair use,159 a few preliminary observations are 
worth making. First, viewing fair use as market failure necessarily characterizes fair use 
as an exception the norm of unbounded copyright rights. As has been shown, fair use 
plays a fundamental role in both bounding and thereby enabling expansive copyright 
rights, fair use is more than an ad hoc exception to market failure. Second, cost-benefit
analysis asks judges to undertake a difficult and speculative factual enquiry. In that 
context, allocation of burden of proof is likely to be more outcome-determinative than the 
actual costs and benefits themselves. Third, even if a case by case cost-benefit analysis 
were feasible, its administrative costs may well overshadow any gains in allocative 
efficiency that it achieves. Consequently, cost-benefit analysis, with or without a 
157 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982). Gordon initially proposed a further 
requirement that “an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff 
copyright owner.” However, Gordon herself has subsequently retreated from that very limiting proposition, 
see Gordon, The “Market Failure” And Intellectual Property: A Response To Professor Lunney, 82 B.U.L. 
REV. 1031, 1032 (2002). Gordon also stresses that market failure is not confined to transactions costs (as 
many have assumed) but incorporates, informational asymmetries, endowment effects and negative 
externalities as well. Gordon, Market Failure, Id. 
158 Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002).
159
 Matthew Sag, The Law And Economics Of Fair Use (2005) (working paper, on file with author). 
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prerequisite of market failure, provides little guidance to judges as to how to actually 
decide fair use cases. 
In contrast to the exacting methodology of the cost-benefit approach, a number of 
judges and scholars have suggested that fair use decisions should be made primarily with 
recourse to normative conceptions of “the good.”160 Perhaps the most well known 
proponent of this analysis is William Fisher. Fisher propos es reconstructing the fair use 
doctrine to “advance a substantive conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture” 
– a vision of “the good life and the sort of society that would facilitate its widespread 
realization.”161 To achieve this goal, Fisher extrapolates a set of preferences from various 
schools of political philosophy.162 While Fisher’s proposal is thoughtfully developed, it 
nonetheless amounts to little more than a collection of thinly substantiated preferences, 163
reflecting one man’s vision of the good life.164
Whether viewed as a subsidy or an entitlement, resorting to normative orderings
as a guide for implementing fair use is problematic for at least three reasons. First and 
most obvious is the difficulty of locating an objective basis for any particular ordering. 
Second, reliance on preference orderings could easily generate perverse results. For 
160
 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Merges, supra note 127, at 132-35 (advocates express recognition of fair use as both a tax on 
copyright owners and a subsidy in favor of certain classes of users)
161 William W. Fisher, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1744 (1988).
162 Id. at 1745-1762.
163
 Fisher’s preference for symphonies over television being one example. Id. at 1768.
164
 See Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1305 (“To concede that the vision is utopian is not enough, for 
the vision that Professor Fisher presented is only one utopian vision among a great many.”) 
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example, allowing a generous scope for fair use in a particular market, such as education 
materials, might reduce incentives for production in that very market. Third, applying fair 
use based on preference orderings as opposed to conduct is not a close fit with the 
objectives of copyright, expressed in the Constitution as the encouragement of the 
progress of science and the useful arts, not the progress of scientists and useful artists. 
Commentators such as Lloyd Weinreb and Michael Madison advocate a variation 
of basising fair use decisions on orderings of social preferences.165 They argue that fair 
use should concentrate on accepted norms and customary practice as the basis for 
determining the scope of the copyright owner’s legitimate interests. Relying on the 
wisdom of the past assumes that those norms and practices were appropriate to begin 
with and are applicable now, both of which may be incorrect. Furthermore, as technology 
and society continue to change, it will always be contested whose accepted norms should 
be applied or which customary practice is most applicable. 
For example, file-sharers argue that their activities are consistent with an ethic of 
sharing and past practices, such as recording and sharing mixed tapes. They equate file-
sharing with norms of individual autonomy which thrive on the internet, such as self-
expression, and creative collaboration.166 The recording industry argues that there is no 
precedent for consumers making perfect substitutes for the industry’s products, and that 
165 Lloyd L. Weinreb Fair’s Fair: A Comment On The Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990), 
(fairness as compliance with accepted norms and customary practice); Michael Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1525. (2004) (calling for more explicit 
acknowledgment of the role of “favored practices” and “accepted patterns” in fair use analysis).
166 Netanel, supra note 147, at 2.
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legitimate sharing has never allowed wholesale copying.167 Opponents of file-sharing
equate it with theft and argue that it threatens the livelihoods of authors, artists, and a 
multi-billion-dollar-a-year industry. Both sides in this debate rely on the virtue of 
preexisting, but inconsistent, norms and practices; this illustrates that reliance on existing 
norms and practices provides little guidance to judges in deciding fair use conflicts. 
The third approach to answering this question looks at the fundamental principles 
underlying copyright law itself. Looking to copyright itself for the assumptions necessary 
to form fair use analysis is preferable to an unbounded normative inquiry precisely 
because it is limited. In spite of its non-statutory nature, transformative use has quickly 
become the dominant factor in fair use analysis.168 The Supreme Court derived the 
transformative use test from its understanding of the purpose of copyright law itself. As 
the Court explained, the goal of copyright is the promotion of science and the arts, and 
that in turn requires some freedom for present authors to build on the works of the past.
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every 
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use 
much which was well known and used before.169
From this foundation the Court concluded that transformative works – any work which 
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
167 Id.
168
 Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding The Transformative Use Test For Fair Use, 80 B.U.L. 
REV. 579, 597 (2000).
169 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, 
8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)).
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new expression, meaning, or message” to the original – deserve special recognition in fair 
use.170
This paper has proposed a structural understanding of fair use as the mechanism 
through which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to the judiciary. 
Judges should recognize fair use decisions as a policy making exercise; however, they 
should also be cognizant of the appropriate limits of policy making in that context. 
Specifically, judges should work within the framework that Congress has given them, and 
that framework is the law of copyright. 
Transformative uses are given preference under the theory that encouraging the 
production of new works that embrace and extend existing works benefits society. The 
unstated assumption here is either that transformative uses are inherently good or that 
transformative uses are more likely than non-transformative uses to be welfare 
enhancing. Both of these assumptions are consistent with the Constitutional mandate for 
copyright, which is the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts, as opposed 
to the promotion of public welfare in general.171 Although the preamble does not create a 
substantive limitation on congressional power,172 it nonetheless informs our 
understanding of what copyright is and how the copyright system is supposed to function. 
Until now, this approach has been confined to the concept of transformativeness. 
But it follows from this article’s structural analysis that the third approach can be 
170 Id. at 579.
171
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
172 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). Nimmer observes that “In fact, the introductory 
phrase, rather than constituting a limitation on congressional authority, has for the most part tended to 
expand such authority.” 1-1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03. 
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expanded to incorporate other principles from copyright law. Although these principles 
are also normative, they have greater legitimacy as they are based in doctrinal principles, 
not just individual preferences. Additionally, these doctrinal norms are at least loosely 
based on congressional preferences since they are drawn from copyright law and its 
constitutional mandate. 
B. A New Approach: Applying Copyright Principles to Animate Fair Use
Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to make transformative use the predominant 
factor in their analysis and to “resist the impulse to import extraneous policies.”
Nonetheless, the limitations of transformativeness suggests that other factors must also be 
considered. Limiting judicial discretion to principles inherent within copyright itself 
makes sense, but transformative use is not the only animating principle from within 
copyright law that judges should look to. 
Transformative use is far from the end of the fair use inquiry. There are a number 
of uses that do not appear to be transformative, but are nonetheless fair use. For example, 
transformative use does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the fair use status of 
untransformative reproduction of materials for use in the classroom provided for in 
Section 107 itself.173 Nor can it explain the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony that 
noncommercial time-shifting of broadcast television is fair use. Transformative use also 
fails to provide a convincing explanation of the fair use status of reverse engineering of 
computer software, discussed in detail below. 
173 17 USC 107. (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, … for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”)
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In addition to these omissions, transformative use also has an ambiguous 
relationship with derivative works. As Jeremy Kudon has observed, the definition of 
derivative work appears to entirely overlap with the concept of transformative use.174
Distinguishing between infringing derivative works and transformative works requires 
some concept of what the appropriate boundaries of the copyright owner’s derivative 
rights should be. Transformativeness appears to be a conclusion rather than a test. 
Finally, because transformativeness typically applies to critical works such as parody or 
review, a number of scholars have expressed concern that transformativeness has made 
some kind of critical element a necessary prerequisite for fair use.175
These criticisms do not imply that transformativeness is an inappropriate guiding 
principle; rather they show that it can not be the only guiding principle elaborating the 
meaning and application of fair use. Other fundamental principles of copyright have a 
role to play in fleshing out fair use, once fair use’s structural role is understood. Three 
key principles from copyright that may also play an animating role in fair use are: the 
idea expression distinction, consumer autonomy and medium neutrality. 
1. The Idea Expression Distinction
Copyright is celebrated as the “engine of free expression” because of the 
incentives it establishes for the creation and dissemination of information.176 However, 
the efficiency of that engine depends on the effectiveness of the idea expression 
174 Kudon, supra 168, at 592. A problem acknowledged but unresolved in Lavel’s original formulation, see 
Leval, supra note 29, at 1111-1112.
175
 Bunker, supra note 111, at 17.
176 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
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distinction. As the Supreme Court explained in Harper & Row, the idea expression 
distinction “strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author’s expression.”177 Where particular situations and advances in technology threaten 
to undermine the idea expression distinction, courts have applied fair use to reinforce this 
copyright principle. 
Cases addressing the reverse engineering of computer software illustrate the 
importance of applying fair use to preserve the idea expression distinction. Computer 
programs are written in source code, a human readable language, but they are typically 
distributed in object code which is only readable by computers.178 The object code 
distributed on a compact discs or in the memory of a video game consoles is protected by 
copyright,179 and yet the same object code also contains ideas and performs functions that 
are not entitled to copyright protection.180 Unlike other copyright protected works, the 
unprotectable elements of computer programs distributed in object code are hidden from 
view. With the right tools, experienced programmers can extract the unprotectable 
177 Id. at 556.
178
 Source code is translated into a set of instructions for a particular type of machine through a process 
known as compilation. The resulting object code consists literally of a long sequence of ones and zeros that 
is then capable of running on a machine; to say that object code is ‘read’ by the machine does not imply 
that it is comprehended. For a more detailed discussion see, Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ron S. Laurie, 
Source Code Versus Object Code, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 235.
179
 17 USC 102(a).
180
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir., 2000).
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elements from object code, however these methods almost invariably require making an 
unauthorized copy, or multiple unauthorized copies, of the program. 
Federal courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a 
computer program as a necessary step in reverse engineering is fair use.181 The Ninth 
Circuit reverse engineering case of Sony v. Connectix,182 illustrates the centrality of 
preserving the idea expression distinction and promoting legitimate competition. From 
the beginning of its decision, the court emphasized the importance of the idea expression 
distinction:
[W]e are called upon once again to apply the principles of copyright law to 
computers and their software, to determine what must be protected as expression 
and what must be made accessible to the public as function.183
Consistent with its decision in Sega,184 the court held that intermediate copying of 
software could be protected as fair use if the copying was necessary to gain access to the 
functional elements of the software.185 The court based its ruling firmly in the importance 
of maintaining the idea expression distinction.
181
 E.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entm’t Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 
F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). See David Rice, Copyright and Contract: 
Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 598, (2004) footnote 19 for 
further references.
182
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir., 2000)
183 Id. at 598. 
184 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993)
185
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir., 2000); Sega 
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-26 (9th Cir. 1993).
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We drew this distinction because the Copyright Act protects expression only, not 
ideas or the functional aspects of a software program. … Thus, the fair use 
doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in 
copyrighted computer software programs.186
The Ninth Circuit decided that the first fair use factor, the nature and purpose of the use, 
favored the defendant in this case because it deemed reverse engineering to be legitimate 
purpose, based on its understanding of the requirements of the idea expression 
distinction.187 To comply with the perceived requirement that all fair uses must be 
transformative, the court unconvincingly asserted that the defendant’s product was 
“modestly transformative,”188 a conclusion based solely on characteristics of the 
defendant’s non-infringing end product rather than its intermediate copying. The court
was distorting the concept of transformativeness because it clearly considered that fair 
use should apply to reverse engineering. If the court had recognized that other principles 
of copyright can guide the application of fair use, not just transformativeness, these 
judicial acrobatics would have been unnecessary. The importance of the idea expression 
distinction alone should have been enough to include reverse engineering within the 
contours of fair use. 
The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the idea expression distinction was also 
central to its determination of the market effect of Connectix’s reverse engineering, the 
fourth fair use factor. The fourth factor requires courts to look beyond the mere presence 
of an effect on the market or potential market of the copyright owner and ask whether the 
market so effected is one which copyright protects. In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite 
186
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir., 2000).
187 Id. at 607. 
188 Id. at 606.
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plainly differentiated the copyright owner’s general economic interests from the limited 
protection afforded by copyright.189 Copyright neither protects the copyright owner from 
parody, nor recognizes a protectable derivative market for criticism in general.190 Just as 
Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright owner’s protectable sphere 
of interest, the reverse engineering cases recognize that the copyright owner has no 
protectable interest in preventing the copying of unprotectable expression and ideas 
buried within its object code. In Sony v Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although 
the defendant’s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the market 
for gaming platforms compatible with Sony games, the Virtual Game Station was a 
“legitimate competitor” in that market.191 The court concluded that Sony’s desire to 
control the market for gaming platforms was “understandable” but that “copyright law … 
does not confer such a monopoly.”192 Principles such as the idea expression distinction 
inform the a priori assumptions that courts must make before they can apply the fair use 
doctrine in general or the four statutory factors in particular. 
189
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591-592 (1994).
190 Id. at 592.
191
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir., 2000). See also See 
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522- 23 (9th Cir. 1993).
192
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir., 2000). See also See 
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1993). (An attempt to 
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose 
of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation 
of the fair use doctrine.)
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2. Consumer Autonomy
Justifying fair use in terms of critical transformative appropriation, or the 
necessity of maintaining the idea expression distinction, may address the majority of fair 
use decisions that courts are called on to make. But they do not bring us any closer to 
rationalizing the fair use status of uncritical appropriation, such as consumer time shifting 
which was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony. This subsection 
speculates that in addition to transformativeness and preserving the idea expression 
distinction, there is a third guiding principle that can be read into copyright – consumer 
autonomy. 
Copyright’s first sale doctrine and significant cases in other areas, such as Sony, 
appear to hinge upon an underlying notion of consumer autonomy. This principle has not 
been explicitly articulated in the cases, but it is both a normatively appealing concept and 
it provides a principled explanation for a range of developments. If consumer autonomy 
does come to be recognized by the courts, it too should be a copyright principle used to 
elucidate fair use.
To the extent that a principle of consumer autonomy exists, it is based on a 
combination of the first sale doctrine and the omission of “use” from the exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner. Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right to distribute a work is limited to its first sale, and the owner of a copy of a work is 
entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without permission from the copyright 
owner, so long as the copy was lawfully made in the first place.193 The copyright owner 
has the sole right to make copies and sell them, but for each copy sold, the owner’s right 
193 17 USC 109(a), but note the exclusions in 109(b).
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to control distribution of any particular copy is exhausted by the first sale of that copy.
According to the Supreme Court,
[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places 
a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his 
exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.194
It has been suggested that the first sale doctrine has been weakened by 
technological changes, especially in the realm of computer software.195 Several courts 
have now accepted the proposition that the transfer of data from a permanent storage 
device to a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”) constitutes a “copying” for 
purposes of copyright law.196 However, Section 117 of the Copyright Act limits the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner with respect to computer programs. That section 
provides that the owner of a copy of a program is entitled to load a copy of that program 
to the computer’s RAM if that is “an essential step in the utilization of the computer 
program in conjunction with a machine.”197 How far the RAM copying doctrine really 
194
 Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
195
 For a nuanced discussion of the impact of technology on the first sale doctrine, see R. Anthony Reese, 
The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV 577 (2003).
196
 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir., 1993); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard 
Assocs. Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In addition to the DC Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the 
RAM copying doctrine has been accepted by a number of lower courts, although implicitly rejected by 
others. See Anthony Reece, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution To The 
Controversy Over RAM “Copies”, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 139 and the cases cited therein. 
197 17 USC 117.
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extends the right of copyright owners to effectively control the “use” of their software 
depends on the proper interpretation the Section 117 exemption.198
The first sale doctrine combined with the absence of any “use” right in copyright 
allow a strong degree of autonomy for consumers; copyright owners are generally unable 
to control the use (as opposed to copying) of their works by the public. For example, the 
seller of a remotely activated garage door (operated by embedded software) has no right 
to control how many times it is opened or which brand of garage door opener is used to 
open it.199 Similarly, the publisher of a magazine presumably has no right to control the 
order in which individual copies are read by consumers. 
In the Galoob case,200 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Game Genie, a device 
that enhanced the operation of the Nintendo gaming platform (by allowing players to 
move differently and have more lives), did not infringe Nintendo’s copyright because it 
neither copied Nintendo’s games nor made derivative works of them.201 The court 
declined to stretch the definition of derivative work to include altering the way a video 
game was played, for fear of chilling innovation in computer applications.202 The court 
198
 See generally, 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08. The critical questions in this regard are: (1) what rights 
do consumers have to use third party parts and services in combination with copyrighted digital content; (2) 
what rights do consumers have to modify or upgrade copyrighted digital content; and (3) to what extent can 
copyright owners can bind consumers to contractual restrictions that conflict with their rights under the first 
sale doctrine? As interesting as these questions are, this is not the place to address them.
199 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir., 2004)
200
 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir., 1992).
201 Id. at 969.
202 Id.
Working Paper, March 2005 Draft
73
concluded that a program or device that improves the performance of a copyrighted 
program without copying it does not create a derivative work of the initial program, even 
if it changes the way the initial program is perceived or displayed.203
These cases and the first sale doctrine itself rest on the logic of a principle of 
consumer autonomy. But, the question remains: is there a freestanding principle of 
consumer autonomy that can inform fair use analysis, assuming that one or more of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights appear to have been infringed? Sony sheds some light 
on this question.
In Sony, the majority explained that although consumers who engaged in time-
shifting of broadcast television copied the entire program – a factor that usually weighs 
heavily against fair use – the extent of their copying did not have its ordinary effect 
because “time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been 
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge.”204 In other words: once a copyrighted 
work is lawfully placed into the hands of a consumer, the consumer is free to consume 
the product as she chooses, regardless of whether the copyright owner would prefer that 
she consume in some other fashion. 
The same logic was applied in Galoob, where the Ninth Circuit held that even if 
the Game Genie created a derivative work (they held it did not), consumers were 
nonetheless entitled to use the Game Genie in conjunction with games they had lawfully 
acquired.205 In both Sony and Galoob, the courts held that copyright owner’s exclusive 
203Id.
204
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-450 (1984)
205
 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir., 1992) (Consumers are 
not invited to witness Nintendo’s audiovisual displays free of charge, but, once they have paid to do so, the 
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rights did not reach so far as to control the precise manner in which consumers used their 
works, provided that consumers paid the going price. 
A principle of consumer autonomy is also evident in Recording Industry 
Association of America’s (“RIAA”) ill-fated challenge to portable MP3 players.206 The 
RIAA sought to enjoin the manufacture and distribution of Diamond Rio’s MP3 player, 
alleging that it did not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the 
AHRA.207 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court held that the AHRA did not 
apply to either a computer hard-drive, or a device that merely received files from a 
computer hard-drive.208 In passing, the court commented on the purpose of the AHRA, 
which it viewed as “the facilitation of personal use.”209 The court adopted the words of 
the House report, explaining that the AHRA’s home taping exemption, “protects all 
noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical recordings.”210
Echoing Sony, the court analogized transferring music from a CD to a portable MP3 
player to recording broadcast television for the purpose of time-shifting. 
fact that the derivative works created by the Game Genie are comprised almost entirely of Nintendo’s 
copyrighted displays does not militate against a finding of fair use.)
206 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 1999).
207
 17 U.S.C.S. § 1002(a)(1), (2) (Digital audio recording device required to conform to the Serial Copy 
Management System); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th 
Cir., 1999)
208 Id. at 1078 - 1079. 
209 Id. at 1079; See also Senate report, “the purpose of [the Act] is to ensure the right of consumers to make 
analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.” S. Rep. 102-
294, at *86.
210
 17 USC § 1008, see H.R. REP. 102-873(I), at *59.
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The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those 
files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is paradigmatic 
noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.211
The idea of consumer autonomy as a guiding principle for fair use can, of course, be 
taken too far. There is an important distinction to made between consumer autonomy for 
consumers acting as consumers as opposed to consumers acting as potential rivals of the 
copyright owner. In Napster, the district court held that the copying which the file-
sharing service facilitated did not qualify as “personal use in the traditional sense.”212 The 
district court saw “critical differences” between Napster’s try-then-buy argument213 and 
the use of VCRs for time-shifting. An individual Napster user “who downloads a copy of 
a song to her hard drive may make that song available to millions of other individuals,
even if she eventually chooses to purchase the CD,”214 whereas time-shifting broadcast 
television or space-shifting music to a portable device does not distribute the copyrighted 
work beyond the intended user. On appeal the Ninth Circuit similarly distinguished the 
“shifting” analyses of Sony and Diamond because of the difference between personal use 
and distribution of the work. 215 So, clearly multiple courts are at least implicitly adopting 
an underlying concept of consumer autonomy. 
211
 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir., 1999) 
(citation & quote omitted).
212
 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (D. Cal., 2000).
213 Napster argued that unauthorized file-sharing did not have an adverse market effect on copyright owners 
because file-sharers might become consumers after sampling music on-line.
214
 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (D. Cal., 2000).
215
 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir., 2001). (“Both Diamond and Sony are 
inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of 
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Copyright law allows some forms of price discrimination, such as temporal 
market segmentation and versioning. For example, high priced hardcover books are 
released earlier than cheaper paperbacks and are also more durable. Yet copyright and 
other laws generally limit the content owner’s control of her products once released into 
the stream of commerce,216 so there is clearly no absolute right to price discriminate. At 
any rate, before they can fully embrace the notion of consumer autonomy, courts should 
consider whether the copyright owner has an interest in price discrimination that 
outweighs considerations of consumer autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some support for 
the notion of consumer autonomy as a fundamental principle of copyright; indeed it is 
difficult to explain the evidentiary presumptions applied in Sony on any other theory. 
3. Medium Neutrality
Finally, in addition to copyright’s preference for transformative uses, maintaining 
the idea expression distinction and (possibly) preserving consumer autonomy, fair use 
analysis should also recognize the importance of medium neutrality. Medium neutrality is 
the principle that a use should not receive less protection, simply by virtue of being 
expressed in a different medium. 
 Medium neutrality is not a principle inherent to copyright in the same way as 
those listed above; however, it provides a useful reality check against importing 
the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed 
the material only to the original user.”)
216 For example, antitrust law prohibits resale price maintenance. For a more detailed discussion of the 
uncertain case for price discrimination in the context of intellectual property see James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, 
or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2007 (2000).
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unwarranted assumptions as to the illegitimacy of non-mainstream points of view and 
non-mainstream vehicles of expression. There is no reason to reject the unequal treatment 
of different media of expression out of hand, but unless Congress has indicated a 
preference for or against a particular medium, courts should at least be suspicious of 
analysis that leads to unequal treatment. 
Again, the reverse engineering cases provide support for the idea of medium 
neutrality in the sense of preserving the idea expression distinction in computer software. 
The abstract idea of a storyline is not protected by copyright, even though it is contained 
in the text of a protected novel; nor are facts, dates and historical events, even if they are 
contained in a protected history book. Medium neutrality dictates that uncopyrightable 
programming structures and APIs should not receive special protection by virtue of being 
released in object code which makes them unreadable to humans. Consistent with the 
principle of medium neutrality, courts allow reverse engineering of object code to 
discover these unprotectable elements. 
Computer software is not exceptional in this regard; even within more conventional 
media, there is a strong case for a presumption of neutrality. For example, a recent 
Eleventh Circuit decision, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,217 indicates that courts 
attempt to accord equal treatment and respect to all forms of criticism, even if some 
necessitate more copying than others. In that case, the court ruled that Alice Randall’s 
retelling of “Gone With The Wind” (“GWTW”) from the perspective of Scarlet’s 
African-American half-sister was clearly a criticism and a parody of the original. Using 
217 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir., 2001).
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this literary device as the vehicle for her rejoinder to the perceived racism of GWTW218
required Randall to appropriate much more of the original than would have been required 
for other methods, such as a literary essay. 
In a very strong statement suggesting the importance of medium neutrality, the 
Eleventh Circuit held: 
The fact that Randall chose to convey her criticisms of GWTW through a work of 
fiction, which she contends is a more powerful vehicle for her message than a 
scholarly article, does not, in and of itself, deprive TWDG of fair-use 
protection.219
The court held that even though Randall had made extensive use of characters, plot points 
and settings in GWTW, her work was capable of fair use protection because the extent of 
that borrowing was required by the critical genre she had chosen.220 What separates 
Randall’s work from mere fan fiction is its critical element – the court was convinced that 
Randall’s book was “principally and purposefully a critical statement.” 221 Based on that 
conviction it was willing to allow Randall enough freedom to achieve her critical purpose 
218 Id. at 1269-1270. (“In the world of GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble aristocracy whose 
idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, by the liberation of the 
black slaves. Through her characters as well as through direct narration, Mitchell describes how both blacks 
and whites were purportedly better off in the days of slavery: "The more I see of emancipation the more 
criminal I think it is. It’s just ruined the darkies," says Scarlett O’Hara. Free blacks are described as 
"creatures of small intelligence . . . like monkeys or small children turned loose among treasured objects 
whose value is beyond their comprehension, they ran wild - either from perverse pleasure in destruction or 
simply because of their ignorance.”) (citations omitted). 
219 Id. at 1269.
220 Id. at 1267.
221 Id. at 1270.
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in her chosen medium. This lends support to the argument that medium neutrality is an 
important copyright principle, and so should be incorporated into fair use analysis.
C. Assessment
Fair use would be much more certain and much easier to administer if Congress 
had formulated policy more completely and given courts a set of bright-line rules to 
follow. Instead, Congress has relieved itself of the burden of difficult decisions and left 
the judiciary to apply a vague and open ended standard. The merits of this choice are 
debatable, but the consequences for judges in fair use cases seem clear – they have no 
choice but to engage in policy making.
In this paper I have suggested that in order to make policy in relation to fair use, 
judges should restrict themselves to one toolkit – principles derived from copyright law. 
This approach lacks the lure of simple and immediate answers offered by a cost-benefit
analysis, but it is a far more realistic exercise to expect judges to undertake, given the 
limits of judicial resources and the speculative nature of any case-by- case empirical 
inquiry. The approach suggested here must also be contrasted against that of encouraging 
courts to justify their assumptions in terms of an unlimited normative inquiry, or the 
closely related proposition of accepted norms and customary practice. Confining a 
judge’s search for grounding assumptions to principles she can justify in terms of 
copyright law itself is still a normative exercise, but it is a sharply more limited one. 
These limits are important because they will, over time, lead to the development of a 
more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence. 
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Conclusion
Deus ex machina, literally “god from the machine,” refers to the resolution of an 
apparently insoluble crisis through divine intervention. In ancient Greek dramas, an
intervening god was often brought on stage by an elaborate piece of equipment; thus the 
expression, god from the machine. Fair use is the god in the copyright machine. Unlike 
the Greek gods, who were unconstrained by reality, fair use does not dissolve the inherent 
conflict arising from opposing interests, but it is the mechanism for their resolution.
Law and technology interact with consequences that are fundamentally 
unpredictable. What is predictable is that copyright law will need to be continually 
adapted to the demands of changing circumstances. Fair use plays a vital role in the 
copyright system by facilitating change. The flexibility of both the rights of copyright 
owners, and the fair use that can be made of copyrighted works, stems from Congress’ 
delegation of policy making responsibility to the judiciary. Fair use is the structure 
through which the conflict between the need for certainty and adaptability can be 
resolved.
Fair use has a curious and misunderstood relationship with the rights of copyright 
owners. Many emphasize fair use’s role in limiting those rights.  However, the fair use 
doctrine has also enabled the expansion of copyright rights, precisely because it 
establishes a flexible boundary on those rights. Historically, and in a contemporary 
setting, fair use has benefited copyright owners by facilitating a more expansive and 
dynamic definition of their rights than would be otherwise possible. 
Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of copyright expansion are bound to 
be disappointed. Congress has seen fit to radically expand the application, duration and 
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scope of rights associated with copyright; there is little point wishing the courts would 
apply the fair use doctrine in order to derail this agenda. Nonetheless, fair use remains an 
important counter-weight to the broad rights of copyright owners. Properly applied, fair 
use ensures significant freedom for criticism, commentary, reference, innovation and 
experimentation. Congress has delegated substantial policy making discretion to judges
so that they can apply fair use in this fashion, as changing circumstances require. Thus 
fair use is actually working as intended: fair use is not a failed protector of the status quo, 
but rather it is a successful agent of change. 
